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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CHOICE OF ADJUDICATION:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ARBITRARY NEW RULE
Gilbert Gaynor·

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter Francis Ford),! a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the FTC did not have the
discretion to act by adjudication against three auto makers, their
financing subsidiaries, and three auto dealers in matters involving consumer credit practices. Because the adjudication
"change[d] existing law, and ha[d] widespread application,"1 the
unanimous three-judge panel wrote sweepingly, the matter could
be addressed only through a formal rulemaking proceeding.
The Francis Ford decision was immediately recognized in
the legal press as having potentially farreaching application in
all areas of federal administrative law. 8 As it stands, the ruling
severely limits the FTC's options in dealing with unfair trade
practices in the Ninth Circuit,· and circumscribes the scope of
discretion of other federal agencies as well. The decision was appealed, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
on November 8, 1982. a Justices White and O'Connor dissented
from the denial of review."
• Member of the California Bar; J.D. cum laude, Whittier College School of Law.
Currently Research Attorney to Presiding Justice Margaret J. Morris, California Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, Division II. The author wishes to thank Professors David M.
Treiman and Thomas Papageorge for their criticism and encouragement.
1. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were
Kennedy and Alarcon, JJ.) (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, April 5, 1982. Rein·
hardt, J. dissented from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982).
2. 673 F.2d at 1010.
3. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 4.
4. [d. See also ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-8 (Sept. 2, 1981).
5. 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982).
6. [d.

1
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After summarizing the facts in the case' and the decision
and analysis of the Francis Ford court,8 the opinion will be examined in light of the relevant case law. It will be demonstrated
that Francis Ford relied on wrongly decided Ninth Circuit precedent,9 and failed to recognize or apply the decisional methodology of the three United States Supreme Court cases which delineate the general scope of administrative agency discretion to
proceed through adjudication rather than rulemaking. Io It will
be argued that the rule of Francis Ford is inconsistent with the
proper principles of decision which emerge from the three High
Court cases,II and has severe workability problems. IS It will be
concluded that, as a radical and unjustified departure from
tested and sound principles of review, the Francis Ford decision
should be overruled at the first opportunity.
B.

THE FACTS

The unfair practice that was the target of the adjudicatory
proceedings was that practice whereby auto dealers would, in
concert with the automakers and their financing subsidiaries,
credit consumer debtors with merely the wholesale value of cars
which had been repossessed from them, charge the debtors with
both direct expenses (e.g., repair) and indirect expenses, including "lost profits," and subsequently resell the cars at retail,
pocketing the surpluses. IS
The FTC brought administrative actions against nine companies-each of the Big 3 automakers, their financing subsidiaries, and three dealerships. All but Francis Ford, a Portland, Oregon dealer, signed consent agreements: they would cease and
desist from the challenged practice, and make restitution totaling some $2 million to injured consumers.I4 The action continued against Francis Ford, and an administrative law judge held
that Francis Ford's practices violated section 5 of the FTCA.IIi
7. See infra text accompanying notes 13-15.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 16-24.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 28-43.

infra text accompanying notes 44-92.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 93-100.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 101-108.
13. 673 F.2d at 1009.
14. 93 F.T.C. 402 (1979). modified, 96 F.T.C. 32 (1980).
15. [d. See 5 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
10. See
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Francis Ford appealed, making numerous allegations of error.
C.

THE DECISION

The Ninth Circuit panel characterized the issue presented
as "narrow": "whether the F.T.C. should have proceeded by
rulemaking in ~his case rather than by adjudication. "18 The
court then set forth the general principles it believed governed
the case. While noting that administrative agencies are not precluded from announcing new policies through adjudication, and
that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the
first instance with the agency, the court underscored that there
may be situations in which the use of adjudication would be an
abuse of discretion. 17 The problem, the Francis Ford court recognized, was one of line-drawing. The court quoted the Supreme
Court's statement in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.: "It is doubtful whether any generalized standard could be framed which
would have more than marginal utility."IB
•

With the general principles sufficiently invoked, the Francis
Ford court then turned to recent Ninth Circuit precedent. In
Patel v. INS,19 decided in 1980, a Ninth Circuit panel had held
that the INS should have proceeded by rulemaking rather than
by adjudication in adding a requirement to a regulation governing immigration to the United States. "The thrust of the
Patel holding," the Francis Ford court wrote, "is that . . . an
agency must proceed by rule making if it seeks to change the
law and establish rules of widespread application. ''20 "Framed
according to Patel, the precise issue therefore is whether this adjudication changes existing law, and has widespread application.
[If] lilt does, ... the matter should be addressed by
rulemaking. "11
Having isolated the law it believed determinative, the Francis Ford court then applied it to the facts at hand. The court
found that since the FTC had cited no cases in accord with its
interpretation of Francis Ford's credit practices as violative of
16. 673 F.2d at 1009.
17.Id.
18. 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974), quoted at 673 F.2d at 1009.
19. 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980).
20. 673 F.2d at 1009 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1010.
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state law (the Oregon enactment of UCC 9-504), the adjudication therefore "changed existing law."22 Since the FTC had
deemed it appropriate to address other credit practices under
UCC 9-504 through rulemaking, "it should also address the
problem of accounting for surpluses by a rule making proceeding,
and not by adjudication."23 Finally, the Francis Ford court
found that "because the rule of the case made below will have
general application,"2' it must necessarily be addressed through
rulemaking.

D.

ANALYSIS OF FRANCIS FORD

In its summary analysis and conclusory sweep, the Francis
Ford court erred in reliance on Patel v. INS, a decision which is
demonstrably incorrect. The Francis Ford court also failed to
understand or apply the decisional methodology established by
the three Supreme Court cases-SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 11),2& NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon CO./.J8 and NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co.27-which control the vital question of administrative discretion to proceed by adjudication rather than rulemaking. Instead, making questionable use of precedent and allowing
unresolved internal inconsistencies, the Francis Ford court arrived at and applied a dubious "generalized standard" to determine whether the agency had made an allowable use of its discretion. This generalized standard has severe. workability
problems and serves as nothing less than a sub rosa repudiation
of Chenery II in the Ninth Circuit.
1.

Francis Ford erred in reliance on Patel

Patel is the only case authority cited by the Francis Ford
court to support its conclusion that when an adjudication
changes existing law and has widespread application, rule making
should be employed. Therefore, if Patel can be shown to have
been incorrectly decided, Francis Ford is rendered highly
suspect.
22. [d.
23. [d.
24. [d.

25. 332 u.s. 194, reh'g denied, 332 U.S. 783 (1947). This case is referred to as Chenery II to distinguish it from an earlier, related case involving the same parties, SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
26. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
27. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
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The Patel court in turn relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Wyman-Gordon. In order to understand why Patel was
erroneously decided, it is necessary to understand the facts and
ratio decidendi of both Patel and Wyman-Gordon.
Material to Patel was an "investor exemption" in the INS
regulation under scrutiny. To qualify for the exemption, and
thereby permanent immigration into the United States; the investor must show at least one year's experience in the particular
investment field, and an investment of at least $40,000. 28 In In
re Heitland 29 in 1974, the INS, by adjudication, added a third
requirement to the investor exemption: the alien's investment
"must tend to expand job opportunities"30 in this country. Patel,
the investor who wished to immigrate, met the first two requirements, which had been codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. Although he had notice of the third requirement, he did
not meet it. He challenged the last requirement on the ground
that the INS had abused its discretion in announcing the requirement in the context of an adjudication rather than through
rulemaking. The Patel court held that there was such an
abuse. 31
Wyman-Gordon also involved a prior adjudication. In its
1966 decision in Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,32 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) "purported to establish the general
rule [that employers must furnish a list of employees to unions
for election purposes], ... but it declined to apply its new rule
to the companies involved"33 in the case. After not applying the
Excelsior rule to the Excelsior case, the NLRB then sought to
apply it against the Wyman-Gordon Company.

The Supreme Court found an explicit statutory violation on
the part of the NLRB: section 6 of the National Labor Relations
Act34 directed the NLRB to make rules in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The rule
28. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1982).
29. 14 I. & N. Dec. 563 (1974).
30. [d. at 567.
31. 638 F.2d at 1205.
32. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
33. 394 U.S. at 763.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976).
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the NLRB sought to make in the Excelsior adjudication was unquestionably a "rulemaking rule" as contrasted with an "adjudicative rule," because, under the APA, a "rulemaking rule" is one
of "future effect,"StI one which is purely prospective in operation.
In Excelsior, the NLRB sought to make a rule of only prospective application through the adjudicative process. This it could
not do: "There is no warrant in law for the Board to replace the
statutory scheme with a rule-making procedure of its own invention," stated the Court.S8
Nothing in Wyman-Gordon precludes the use of adjudication in the formulation of agency policy; however, a valid adjudication may still create binding precedent. Wyman-Gordon
merely clarified that adjudication may not be used to make purportedly quasi-legislative rules, or to make adjudicative rules
which are not binding on the parties to the adjudication, but
only on parties to future adjudications. 87
Patel relied heavily on Wyman-Gordon. The Patel court
analogized Heitland to Excelsior, and although in Heitland the
new rule had been applied to the parties to the adjudication,
declared that "Heitland, like Excelsior, created a broad requirement of prospective application . . . . Under the authority of
Wyman-Gordon, we conclude that if the INS wished to add the
job-creation criterion, it should have done so in a rulemaking
procedure."8s
The reliance on Wyman-Gordon and the analogy of
Heitland to Excelsior reveal that the Patel court completely
failed to isolate the outcome-determinative elements of WymanGordon; indeed, failed to recognize what that case held. The gravamen of Wyman-Gordon was that the NLRB abused its discretion in Excelsior by purporting to make a legislative-type rule
through an adjudicative proceeding. 89 What was the factor which
made the rule a legislative-type one? It was that the rule was
35. 394 U.S. at 763-64. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976) provides that a .. 'rule' means the
whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency . . . ."
36. 394 U.S. at 765.
37.1d.
38. 638 F.2d at 1203-04.
39. 394 U.S. at 765.
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prospective only in application. It was not applied to the parties
to the adjudication; it had only future effect. Thus, it fell
squarely within the definition of what a legislative rule is: "an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect. ""0
Since the Heitland rule was applied in Heitland, it was not,
contrary to the Patel court's assumption, a rule of future effect
within the meaning of that phrase as interpreted by the Supreme Court. As the Wyman-Gordon dissent makes clear, the
entire case turns on this pointY
The Patel court's misuse of Supreme Court precedent was
not limited to Wyman-Gordon however; the Ninth Circuit panel
additionally misconstrued both Chenery II and Bell Aerospace
in assuming, without analysis, that the examples given in each
decision of instances where adjudication would be appropriate
were meant to be exclusive, rather than illustrative, of proper
agency exercise of discretion.42 The Patel court further rigidified
the scope of discretion in writing that the H eitland rule was not
valid because it "does not call for a case-by-case determination.
It may be stated and applied as a general rule even though the
result may vary from case to case."43 Under this reasoning, however, since the SEC's rule at issue in Chenery II, restricting
stock trading by corporate management during corporate reorganizations, was a rule which could be stated and applied generally, although the result would vary from case to case, it too
would have to fall. On this point, Patel conflicts directly with
the superior precedent of Chenery II.
To give operative effect to the Patel court's assumptions regarding Chenery II and Bell Aerospace would be to drastically
undercut the central theme of both decisions-that there is
broad agency discretion to proceed by adjudication rather than
rulemaking-not narrow discretion from a circumscribed list of
adjudicatory procedures found appropriate at other times for
other agencies.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976), quoted at 394 U.S. at 763-64.
41. 394 U.S. at 769, 774 (Black, J., dissenting).
42. 638 F.2d at 1204-05, citing Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202-03, and Bell Aerospace,
416 U.S. at 1294.
43. 638 F.2d at 1205.
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2. Francis Ford erred in failing to follow Chenery II and Bell
Aerospace
In addition to its reliance on the incorrectly decided Patel,
the Francis Ford court erred in failing to understand or apply
the decisional methodology established by the Supreme Court in
Chenery II and Bell Aerospace. These cases, read together with
Wyman-Gordon, delineate the governing analytic framework by
which federal courts should determine whether an administrative agency has abused its discretion by proceeding through adjudication in a given matter.
a.

Chenery II

In Chenery II, the question was whether the SEC could apply a newly formulated policy-that members of corporate management could not trade in their company's securities during the
period of a corporate reorganization, even where there was no
allegation of fraud or concealment-against the parties to the
case without first proceeding through formal rulemaking. H The
Supreme Court held that the SEC could validly proceed without
promulgating a rule. 411
While the Court's opinion in Chenery II is not a model of
structural clarity, several major analytic themes unmistakably
emerge to provide the proper principles for judicial review of an
administrative agency decision to proceed by adjudication.
The controlling principle, reiterated no less than five times
in the course of the Court's opinion,4s is that of judicial deference to administrative judgment. The reason for such deference
is fundamental: administrative agencies are expert in their
fields, and are best equipped to make judgments in them. This is
not merely tautological; the expertise of administrative judgment no less than "justifies the use of the administrative process."'" Chenery II establishes a strong presumption against
finding an abuse of administrative discretion. 48
44. 332 U.S. at 196-99.
45. Id. at 209.
46. See 332 U.S. at 213 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
47. 332. U.S. at 209.
48. [d. at 202-03, 207.
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In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the Court looked at the nature and structure of the underlying legislation empowering the agency to act. How broad is the
agency's discretion as envisioned by Congress?49 In Chenery II,
the Court found that Congress had intended the SEC to have
"broad powers to protect the various interests at stake . . . .
The very breadth of the statutory language precludes a reversal
of the Commission's judgment save where it has plainly abused
its discretion in these matters. "110
The Court additionally considered the appropriateness of
proceeding without formal rulemaking in the particular case. Is
there a "reasonable basis" for doing SO?1I1 "[W]e are free to disturb the Commission's conclusion only if it lacks any rational
and statutory foundation . . . ."1IlI
Finally, Chenery II calls for an explicit balancing test. First,
the reviewing court is to consider the "retroactive effect" of allowing the adjudication to stand.1IS ("Every case of first impression has a retroactive effect .... ")114 The retroactive effect in
Chenery II was that stock transactions by the defendants completed prior to the adjudication and application of the new rule
would be stripped of profit. 1I1I Second, "such retroactivity must
be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is
contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles. If that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law."lIe
b. Bell Aerospace
Twenty-seven years after it first addressed the problem of
administrative discretion to proceed by adjudication, the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of its earlier decision by methodically applying the principles announced in Chenery II to
49. [d. at 208.

50.Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54.Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.

at 202·03, 207.
at 207.
at 203.
at 197·98, 203.
at 203.
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find, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace CO.,1I7 that the NLRB would
not abuse its discretion in proceeding through adjudication to
make an employee classification.
Prior to Bell Aerospace, the NLRB had excluded all managerial employees from National Labor Relations Act coverage. liS
In this case, the NLRB sought to include buyers under the Act's
coverage even though it was believed that they were "managerial
employees," and certified a union, after requisite election, as the
exclusive bargaining agent of Bell Aerospace's buyers. The company refused to bargain, however, and litigation resulted. 1I9 The
Supreme Court found, first, that all employees properly classified as "managerial" were excluded from coverage. 60 The second
issue was whether the NLRB was required in the future to proceed by rulemaking rather than adjudication in determining
whether buyers were or were not managerial employees. The
Court held, unanimously on the issue, that the NLRB was not
precluded from proceeding through adjudication in making such
a determination. 61
As the Bell Aerospace Court was not reviewing a past
agency adjudication to determine whether an agency had in fact
abused its discretion, it was not logically necessary to invoke the
principle of judicial deference to past administrative judgment.
Nevertheless, the Court quoted extensively from Chenery II and
Wyman-Gordon on the broad scope of agency discretion,62 stating that those cases "make plain that the Board is not precluded
from announcing new principals in an adjudicative proceeding
and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in
the first instance within the Board's discretion."6s
The second part of the judicial inquiry concerned the
agency's statutory authority to act. In Bell Aerospace, the Court
57. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
58. [d. at 275-79.
59. [d. at 269-72.
60. [d. at 289.
61. [d. at 289-90. Four Justices dissented from the view that managerial employees
as a class were not covered under the NLRA, but concurred without separate comment
in the holding that the NLRB was not precluded from proceeding by adjudication in the
case. 416 U.S. at 295 (White, J., dissenting in part).
62. [d. at 292-94.
63. [d. at 294.
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considered and brought to the forefront the NLRB's authority
to act in an early part of the opinion, dealing with congressional
intent to exclude from NLRA coverage all employees properly
classified as "managerial," but to leave the determination of
which employees were in fact "managerial" with the Board.Sf
Next, the Court turned to whether there was a reasonable
basis for proceeding by adjudication in the present case. It
found "ample indication that adjudication is especially appropriate. . . "SII because of the particular nature of the determination the NLRB had to make: whether buyers in any number of
contexts were managerial.
In conclusion, the Bell Aerospace Court performed the balancing required by Chenery II: It found that there was a failure
to demonstrate adverse consequences for the parties involved by
virtue of past good faith reliance on Board decisions.ss By clear
implication, retroactivity was approved.
The Court also noted that the rulemaking which it refused
to mandate would indeed provide a forum for the views of those
affected in industry and labor. But such a forum is not an end in
itself. The purpose of providing such a forum, the Court
stressed, was simply to supply the agency with "the relevant information necessary to mature and fair consideration of the issues."S7 It was well within the Board's discretion in the instant
case to decide that adjudication might also produce such data.
Any suggestion that non-parties to the adjudication had a "right
to be heard" in a rulemaking forum was summarily foreclosed;
due process was satisfied because "[t]hose most immediately affected, the buyers and the company in the particular case, are
accorded a full opportunity to be heard before the Board makes
its determination. "S8
c. Wyman-Gordon reconciled
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co. se is the only Supreme Court
64. [d. at 279·84.
65. [d. at 294.
66. [d. at 295.
67. [d.
68. [d.

69. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
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case to find that an agency actually had abused its discretion in
proceeding through adjudication. As such, it appeared to Professor Kenneth Davis, the noted administrative law commentator,
to "pull in the opposite direction" from Bell Aerospace. 7o But
Wyman-Gordon is entirely consistent with Bell Aerospace, and
with Chenery II as well.
While the controlling principle is one of deference to administrative judgment, in Wyman-Gordon the agency had clearly
acted outside the scope of its statutory authority. It had purported to promulgate a legislative-type rule without adhering to
the congressionally-mandated procedures to be followed in making a legislative-type rule. 71 Thus, it had abused its discretion.
Therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to reach the inquiry
as to the appropriateness of adjudication in Wyman-Gordon, or
to perform the balancing test of Chenery II. On the other hand,
if the NLRB had applied the rule it promulgated in Excelsior to
the parties in that case, as the Court declared it could validly
have done,7lI there would have been no abuse of discretion. The
Bell Aerospace Court, citing approvingly to Wyman-Gordon,78
clearly recognized there was no conflict between the cases.
d. Synthesis
The decisional methodology delineated by the Supreme
Court for use in deciding whether an administrative agency has
abused its discretion by proceeding through adjudication in a
given matter is not rigid or mechanical. Instead, it is sensitive to
several factors and principles. First, the presumption that an
agency has not abused its discretion is to be taken seriously.
Second, the reviewing court should look to the statutory structure and legislative intent to gauge the extent of the agency's
discretionary scope. Third, the court should consider whether
there is a rational basis for proceeding by adjudication in the
instant case. Finally, the court should perform the balancing test
of Chenery II and Bell Aerospace.
70.
71.
72.
73.

2 DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 7:25, at 122 (1980).
394 U.S. at 763-64.
[d. at 765.
416 U.S. at 293-94, quoting Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 765-66.
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3. Precedent ignored

The Francis Ford court failed to apply the decisional methodology of the Supreme Court to the facts before it.
The Ninth Circuit panel did make a perfunctory invocation
of the principle that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance with the agency.'· But there is no
evidence of any intent on the part of the court to give this principle any actual weight, and the concept of judicial deference to
administrative judgment is not mentioned in the opinion.
Just as legislatures are presumed to have acted rationally,
administrative agencies must be presumed to have acted within
the scope of their discretion. This principle is material and basic. As the Court in Chenery II declared: "The scope of our review of an administrative order wherein a new principle is announced and applied is no different from that which pertains to
ordinary administrative action. The wisdom of the principle
adopted is none of our concern. Our duty is at an end when it
becomes evident that the Commission's action is based upon
substantial evidence and is consistent with the authority granted
by Congress. "'711
The Francis Ford court did not examine the statutory language or legislative history to determine what the proper scope
of the FTC's discretion to proceed by adjudication might be in
light of those controlling considerations. Yet the. structure and
purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act and its amendments clearly indicate that the FTC has been empowered with
broad discretion to proceed by adjudication in enforcing the
Act.'6
74. 673 F.2d 1008, 1009.
75. 332 U.S. at 207 (citations omitted).
76. This footnote will proceed chronologically through the FTCA and its amendments in demonstrating that Congress empowered the FTC with broad discretion to proceed by adjudication in enforcing the Act.
A. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914
Section 5 of the original FTCA read: "unfair methods of competition in commerce
are hereby declared unlawful." Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5,38 Stat. 717,
719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976». Section 5 provides for hearings, and
for the ability to issue cease and desist orders to impose fines. [d. Note that the FTC was
to enforce not "rules made pursuant to the statutory authority," but the broad prohibition of unfair methods itself.
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The court's analysis of whether adjudication was appropriThe legislative history of the 1914 Act indicates that the FTC was designed to enforce the Act specifically through adjudication. This is reflected in the fact that the FTC
did not even attempt the issuance of a formal substantive rule until 1963. See 16 C.F.R.
§ 400.1 (1975). See also National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
The congressional rationale for leaving the FTC without the explicit power to proceed through promulgation of legislative-type rules, and the rationale for not providing a
definition of what constitutes unfair practices, are closely related:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair
practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this
field. Even if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited it would at once be necessary to begin
over again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition,
it would undertake an endless task. It is also practically impossible to define unfair practices so that the definition will fit
business of every sort in every part of the country.
Joint Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914). Accord S.
REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914). This rationale applies equally to congressional definitions of unfair practices and to the Commission's definition of unfair practices through legislative-type rules, and is central to the FTC's statutory mission.
B. The Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938
The 1938 amendments enlarged the jurisdiction· of the FTC to include "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce," irrespective of whether such conduct injured
competitors. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976».
The chief purpose of the expansion of the FTC's jurisdiction was to supercede the
Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). Raladam had
held that section 5 was aimed at unfair methods of competition and therefore an adverse
effect on competitors, not merely on consumers, was required under the Act as a requisite for FTC action. [d. at 654. The result was that if all the competitors in an industry
practiced the same unfair methods, each would be immune from section 5. See Kintner
& Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable Consumer
Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651, 658 (1975). In adding the phrase "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce," Congress expanded the FTC's jurisdiction and
reemphasized the purpose of the Act and Commission to protect consumers.
Consider Francis Ford in light of Raladam: In Raladam the judiciary limited the
FTC's enforcement power by ruling that if unfair methods did not tend to affect a competitor's economic health, they were beyond the FTC's reach. This had the practical
effect that where unfair practices had widespread application in an industry, so that
adverse effects on competitors could not be demonstrated although adverse effects on
consumers could be, the FTC, under Raladam, could not reach them. Under Francis
Ford, where a business can show that its unfair practices have widespread application in
an industry, and the remedy "changes existing law" (and what remedy for existing widespread unfair practices which would be effective for a whole industry would not "change"
law?), the FTC is precluded from proceeding by the only means allowed to it at the time
of Raladam: adjudication.
Yet Congress clearly rejected the Raladam thinking:
Under the present [unamended] act, it has been intimated in
court decisions that the Commission may lose jurisdiction of a
case of deceptive and similar unfair practices if it should develop in the proceeding that all competitors in the industry
practiced the same methods . . .. Under the proposed
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the instant context-whether it had a reasonable ba-

amendment, the Commission would have jurisdiction to stop
the exploitation or deception of the public, even though the
competitors of the respondent are themselves entitled to no
protection because of their engaging in similar practices.
S. REP. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
C. The Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Amendments of 1973
These amendments worked a three-fold expansion of FTC authority. First, the maximum penalty for cease and desist order violations was doubled to $10,000. Second, the
FTC could represent itself in federal courts if the Justice Department did not act. Third,
the Commission could seek injunctive relief in court upon a reasonable belief that any
law it enforced was being violated. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, §
408, 87 Stat. 591, 591-92 (1973) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 45(m), 53 (g) & 56
(1976».
The purpose of these changes, especially the third, was to strengthen the FTC in its
consumer protection role, and to allow it to proceed against potential violators even
though they may have no prior cease and desist orders outstanding against them. See S.
REP. No. 93-151, 93d Cong., lat. Sess. 9-10 (1973). Thus, the discretion of the FTC to
proceed by adjudication was again confirmed.
D. The FTC Improvement Act of 1975
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act-Federal Trade Commission Act of 1975-extended the FTC's reach to matters "in or affecting" commerce, clarified and affirmed the
FTC's power to promulgate trade regulation rules, and expanded the FTC's adjucative
remedies to include actions for civil penalties and consumer restitution. Act of Jan. 4,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 201-206, 88 Stat. 2193, 2200 (1975).
Section 18 of the FTCA confirmed the authority of the Commission to issue substantive rules, and made explicit the procedure for doing so. The legislative history
shows that Congress candidly recognized that the FTC had been making rules without
unambiguous authority since 1963, and sought to legitimize and formalize that practice,
making its own changes in the process. But the conference report did not suggest that
rulemaking was anything other than a complementary instrument to be used in conjunction with adjudication in filling in the interstices of the Act. There is some language in
the House Report which suggests a preference for rulemaking over adjudication:
Substantial sentiment has developed over the years that in
many instances the desirable manner of implementing the
broad standards of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act should be by means of rule-making with the complaint-cease and desist order procedure used as a means of enforcing the rules. Rule-making offers the obvious advantages
that (a) each person who could be affected by the proposed
rule is afforded an opportunity to be heard on it in a well defined and well understood procedure, (b) the rules are developed in advance of their application to any person or practice
and apply with uniformity, and (c) judicial review of any rule
is available as well as of the procedures used in adopting it.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 7702, 7714. However, it would be clearly erroneous to bootstrap this legislative
dicta into a general rule: the language appears only in a House Report, and thus cannot
be said to represent the belief of the entire Congress. And the language itself is hardly
conclusive-although it suggests that rulemaking would be appropriate "in many instances," it fails to specify in which instances rulemaking is preferable to adjudication.
The inescapable inference is that such determinations are to be made by the Commission
itself. Nowhere does Congress suggest the FTC has abused its adjudicative authority in
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sis-was founded on an apparent non sequitur. The court foany case, nor that it wished to replace adjudication with rule making. Rather, the entire
tenor of the legislative history indicates that the section 18 rulemaking power is to be
viewed as an addition to the Commission's remedial armamentarium. The strongest support for this view lies in the fact that other legislative provisions added in 1975 markedly
indicate that Congress intended to considerably expand the FTC's authority to proceed
in the first instance through adjudication.
Section 19 of the FTCA, Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637 § 206(a), 88 Stat.
2~01, (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a) (1976», implements the theme of consumer
protection in its most direct form, by providinjf for consumer money damages and other
relief as an FTC remedy. It is inherent in Congress' structuring of this section that it
contemplated the FTC would in its informed discretion proceed in some matters through
rulemaking and others through adjudication. Section 19 provides for consumer redress
actions to be brought by the FTC in two circumstances: (1) for violations of trade regulation rules; and (2) where the FTC has proceeded against a party and the Commission
had issued a final cease and desist order with regard to a practice which a reasonable
man under the circumstances would have known was dishonest or fraudulent. 15 U.S.C.
§ 57b(I), (2) (1976). It is crucial to note that redress is available not only for practices
committed after the cease and desist order was issued, but for those practices resulting
in a cease and desist order-such as that practice at issue in the Francis Ford
adjudication.
The second major expansion of the FTC's adjudicative authority was in the power to
seek civil penalties. Previously, the FTC could only seek such penalties from parties.
against whom a cease and desist order had become final. The FTC Improvement Act
gave the FTC the power to seek civil penalties in two additional circumstances: (1) where
a party has violated a trade regulation rule with actual or fairly imputed knowledge that
the act is unfair or deceptive and prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(l)(a) (1976); and, (2)
where the FTC has obtained a final cease and desist order against an act or practice, and
where the party to the civil penalty action, who need not have been a party to the cease
and desist order had actual knowledge that the act or practice was unfair or deceptive
and unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(l)(b) (1976).
The creation of the latter section quite clearly reveals that Congress intended that
the FTC have the power to proceed against individual violators of section 5, as well as
against violators of the trade regulation rules, and that in adjudicative proceedings
against such violators could formulate adjudicative "rules" which, if other parties had
knowledge of them, would apply against them with the same force as would the trade
regulation rules. "[TJhe section seems to authorize rulemaking by adjudication." Kintner
& Smith, supra, 26 MERCER L. REv. at 682.
E. The FTC Improvement Act 011980
The 1980 amendments made a number of important changes in rulemaking procedure, including making trade regulation rules subject to congressional veto. Act of May
28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21(a)-(h), 94 Stat. 376-379 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a
(Supp. V 1981».
The 1980 amendments grew out of congressional hearings into the overall operation
of the FTC. From those comprehensive hearings one overriding congressional purpose
arose: to prevent the FTC from overreaching in the area of rule making. Each of the
examples provided in the Senate Report as "Background and Need for the Legislation"
dealt with a case in which the FTC had, in the view of Congress, gone beyond its statutory authority in the area of rulemaking. No similar criticism was leveled at the FTC's
adjudicative activities. S. REP. No. 96-500, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1102, 1102-1105.
The legislative history of the 1980 amendments illuminates Congress' view of the
wide scope and purpose of the FTC's discretion to proceed by adjudication rather than
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cused on a pending rule making proceeding also relating to credit
practices of auto dealers:"
The pending rulemaking proceeding and this adjudication seek to remedy, more or less, the same
credit practices. Although the former is directed
against the practices, inter alia, of car dealers in
their accounting of deficiencies, and the latter is
directed against a car dealer by reason of his
practices in failing to account for surpluses, both
matters are covered by VCC § 9-504. If the rule
for deficiencies is thought by the F.T.C. to be
"appropriately addressed by rulemaking," it
should also address the problem of accounting for
surpluses by a rulemaking proceeding, and not by
adjudication. 78

Aside from the court's inexact equation of two distinct
credit practices (Francis Ford's practice of selling repossessed
cars at retail and crediting consumers with only wholesale value
is emphatically not "the same credit practice, more or less" as
that of selling repossessed cars at wholesale and charging the
consumer debtor with the resultant deficiency; the practices are
mutually exclusive in any given case), the somewhat startling
proposition that "appropriate for rulemaking" necessarily
means "inappropriate for adjudication" is not explained or supported with authority by the Francis Ford court. Nor could the
rulemaking. The Senate version of the amendments allowed the FTC to proceed with
rulemaking only if it had .. 'reason to believe' that unfair or deceptive acts or practices
. . . were 'prevalent'. Prevalence exists only if the Commission has iseued cease and desist orders regarding acts and practices that are addressed by the rule, or if other information available ... indicates a 'pattern' of unlawful conduct." Id. at 1121. Although
this provision was later dropped as too restrictive of the Commiseion, the Conference
Report indicated approval of its basic philosophy. Id. at 1147. And it appears, from the
language indicating that the first way to establish prevalence was to proceed through
discrete adjudication within the area of potential rulemaking, that Congrese intended
that the FTC would use adjudication to develop its knowledge of areas for potential
rulemaking, and that adjudication is a desirable and appropriate first step in dealing
with practices which are widespread and not currently remedied in the law. Id. at 1121.
F. Summary of the Statutory Inquiry
The statutory structure and the legislative history of the FTCA and its amendments
overwhelmingly indicate that the FTC has been empowered by Congrese with broad discretion to proceed by adjudication in enforcing section 5's broad prohibition against unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
77. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975).
78. 673 F.2d at 1010.
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proposition be said to be a logical one. Yet it undercuts the repeated emphasis in all three Supreme Court decisions that there
is to be broad agency discretion to be responsive to changing
circumstances in the fields of regulatory expertise.
The inquiry into whether the Francis Ford adjudication had
a reasonable basis under the circumstances need not have been
an exhaustive one. The unfair practice which formed the basis
for the adjudications against nine companies, including Francis
Ford, was that the auto dealers, in collusion with the auto companies and their financing subsidiaries, had failed to credit consumers who had their cars repossessed and resold by the dealers
with the actual value the dealers received on resale. By consent
agreement, the other eight companies agreed to return some $2
million to consumers. 79 The purpose and result of the adjudicatory proceedings was consumer redress. And as the legislative
history of the FTCA and the language of section 19 unmistakably indicate, consumer protection in the form of consumer redress actions based on cease and desist orders are specifically
authorized by Congress, for the dual purposes of achieving consumer redress in the instant case, and developing experience in
an area which may serve as a prelude to formal rulemaking. 80
The argument that it is "unfair" to single out one violator,
or a very few, for a practice followed by many, ignores both the
fact that Francis Ford was required to adjudicate, not the practices of an industry as a whole, but merely its own practices. In
addition, it overlooks the fact that Congress intends that the
FTC have the option to develop experience with individual violators in a significant number of instances before a formal
rulemaking proceeding is commenced. 81 Far from an abuse of
discretion, the Francis Ford adjudication, with its significant
consumer redress results, may be close to an exemplar of the
congressionally-intended FTC adjudication.
4.

The Balancing

The next phase of the inquiry turns to the balancing of
Chenery II and Bell Aerospace. (In Chenery II the balancing
79. See supra note 14.
SO. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(I), (2) (1976). See supra note 76.
81. See supra note 76.
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test was announced in the middle of the opinion;82 in Bell Aerospace, it was the final consideration of the opinion. 8S ) The "retroactive effect" of allowing the adjudication to stand-i.e., the
undesirable consequence which might flow from application of
the adjudicatory rule announced in a case of first administrative
impression-is to be balanced against "the mischief of producing
a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and
equitable principles."8.
The Francis Ford court failed to apply, or even recognize
the existence of, the balancing test of Chenery II and Bell
Aerospace.
If the legislative history is sparse and ambiguous, as it

might be with state statutes creating administrative agencies, or
if an administrative agency has attempted to extend its reach
through adjudication into unfamiliar areas of unclear jurisdiction,811 then this phase of the inquiry into whether an agency has
abused its discretion might be a critical, case-determinative one.
But this was not the case in Francis Ford. 811.1
The factors the Bell Aerospace Court looked to are illustrative: Was there reliance by industry on agency decisions contrary to the new adjudicative rule?;88 Was the reliance if any justifiable and in good faith?;8" Are fines and damages to be
imposed?88 These considerations point to possible adverse consequences of retroactive effect.
Applied to the facts of Francis Ford, these factors make an
unconvincing case for finding an abuse of discretion. As the
Francis Ford court admitted, there were no past FTC adjudications indicating a contrary result from this proceeding. 89 Thus,
there could not be any reliance at all upon nonexistent decisions,
82. 332 U.S. at 203.
83. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294-95.
84. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 204.
85. Ct. NLRB v. Insurance'Agents Int'. Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 447, 449 (1960).
85.1 See supra note 76 for a discUB8ion of the history of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
86. 416 U.S. at 295.
87. [d.
88. [d.

89. 673 F.2d at 1010.
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let alone a justifiable, good faith reliance. And even where there
might be such reliance, as the Bell Aerospace Court indicated
might be the case regarding the NLRB's past decisions holding
buyers to be non-managerial employees,80 the party against
whom the adjudication would apply must show substantial adverse consequences. 81
The Bell Aerospace Court's inquiry into fines or damages
may be seen as another aspect of its concern with results which
are both equitable and consistent with statutory purpose. In
Francis Ford, as in Bell Aerospace, the punitive element of fines
was not at issue; thus the anomaly of punitive damages resulting
from good faith reliance was not present in either case. In the
adjudication on which Francis Ford was based, the consent
agreement had resulted in $2 million being paid back to consumers who had been the targets of the unfair trade practice. These
were not punitive in nature, but direct compensatory damages
capable of fairly precise ascertainment in each case. The FTC
sought in the adjudication similar damages in the form of direct
consumer redress from Francis Ford. In this respect the remedy
was similar to that approved by the Supreme Court in Chenery
II, where members of corporate management who had traded in
corporate stock during a reorganization were ordered to surrender their stock at cost-i.e., to forego the profit made on the
transaction determined illegal, just as the companies in Francis
Ford agreed to restitution for the profits they made from the
unfair practice. Thus, the imposition of damages could not be
said to weigh heavily against the allowance of adjudication in
Francis Ford.
.
The final consideration is that of the mischief done by a result which is contrary to statutory design or legal and equitable
principles. Because the result achieved in Francis Ford defeats
the congressional intent, expressed in definite statutory design,
to give the FTC the power to proceed by adjudication in enforcing section 5, as a primary means of enforcement and as a developmental tool for formulating agency policy which may later result in formal rulemaking, the disallowance of adjudication is
90. 416 U.S. at 295.
91. [d. "It has not been shown that the adverse consequences ensuing from such
reliance are so substantial that the Board should be precluded from reconsidering the
issue in an adjudicative proceeding." [d.
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contrary to statutory design. The decision defeats the congressionally mandated goals of consumer protection from unfair
trade practices, and consumer redress as a major remedy.91.1 The
consumer victims of Francis Ford's unfair credit practices remain uncompensated for the definite harm they have suffered,92
and Francis Ford and all other ·dealers remain apparently free to
continue practices which have been adjudicated unfair, at least
until the FTC promulgates a rule specifically governing such
practices. The "result reached by the Ninth Circuit in the instant
case is contrary to basic principles of fairness.
5. Inadvertent irony

Misusing precedent and allowing unresolved internal inconsistency in its opinion, the Francis Ford court promulgated and
applied a dubious "generalized standard" without adequate support in the law.
On the question of "drawing the line" for agency abuse of
discretion, the Francis Ford court quoted Bell Aerospace: "It is
doubtful whether any generalized standard could be framed
which would have more than marginal utility."98 This quotation
is clearly taken out of context by the Francis Ford court; in its
original, it referred to generalized standards to determine
whether buyers were managerial or non-managerial employees.
The point the Bell Aerospace Court sought to make was that
this would vary according to the duties of the buyers in each
employment situation. 9• It is not what the Francis Ford court
91.1 See supra note 76.
92. Hypothetically, of course, each consumer wrongfully dellied a surplus could sue
to recover under state law. However, the sums involved from each consumer, generally
only a few hundred dollars, and the probable lack of knowledge on the part of consumers
of this particular accounting practice, make this remedy unlikely to be pursued, and
ineffective as a general remedy.
93. 673 F.2d at 1009, quoting Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294.
94. The passage in which the "marginal utility" language appears is as follows:
As the Court of Appeals noted, "[tlhere must be tens of
thousands of manufacturing, wholesale and retail units which
employ buyers, and hundreds of thousands of the latter." 475
F.2d at 496. Moreover, duties of buyers vary widely depending
on the company or industry. It is doubtful whether any generalized standard could be framed which would have more than
marginal utility. The Board thus has reason to proceed with
caution, developing its standards in a case-by-case manner
with attention to the specific character of the buyers' authority and duties in each company.
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took it to be, a statement about the doubtful wisdom of making
general rules regarding the choice between rulemaking and adjudication. But in the context in which the Ninth Circuit panel
misquoted the statement, it is inadvertently ironic.
The irony-and the internal inconsistency-arises in that
after reciting that generalized standards regarding the choice between rule making and adjudication have marginal utility, a
scant two paragraphs later the Francis Ford court framed such a
generalized standard, and applied it. "Framed according to
Patel, the precise issue therefore is whether this adjudication
changes existing law, and has widespread application. It does,
and the matter should be addressed by rulemaking."911 This test,
drawn from an entirely different regulatory field, immigration,
and applied to the FTC, is transparently a generalized standard
of the sort the court inveighed against two paragraphs earlier.
6. Sub rosa repudiation of precedent
The "generalized standard" of Francis Ford is inconsistent
with Wyman-Gordon and Bell Aerospace and, if allowed to
stand, would effect a sub rosa repudiation of Chenery II.
In Bell Aerospace, the adjudication in question "changed
existing law" in that prior to 1970, a long line of cases had consistently excluded buyers from NLRA coverage. The Supreme
Court nevertheless ruled that the agency could adjudicatively
determine that buyers were capable of being non-managerial."
And the change at issue had "widespread application": no company was exempt from the possibility that its buyers would be
classed as non-managerial and thus accorded bargaining rights.
Even though the determination of buyers' status was to be made
under a case by case application, the rule itself applied to all. 97
In Wyman-Gordon, eight Justices would have upheld the
Excelsior "rule" against the Wyman-Gordon Company, had it
been applied in the original adjudication against the Excelsior
416 U.S. at 294.
95. 673 F.2d at 1010.
96. 416 U.S. at 290.
97. See supra note 94.
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Underwear· Company.98 The adjudicative rule in that case
"changed existing law" in the sense that previously, there had
been no requirement that an employer could be compelled to
furnish a list of employees to the union, but thereafter the
Board could so mandate. And the new rule was to have "widespread application"-to apply to all employers.
In Chenery II, the Supreme Court held adjudication appropriate for formulation of a policy regarding management trading
in corporate stock during corporate reorganizations. This was
clearly a rule of widespread application: it applied to all corporate officers of publicly-held corporations undergoing reorganizations. And at least to the extent that there was no law prohibiting the practice previously,99 the adjudication "changed existing
law" in the exact sense that the action against Francis Ford for
practices which had not previously been proscribed by the FTC
"changed existing law." The "generalized standard" of Francis
Ford is facially inconsistent with Chenery II. Francis Ford must
therefore be understood as a sub rosa repudiation of that decision on its own terms.
It might, of course, be argued that the Chenery II adjudicative rule did not "change existing law" because there was no
prior SEC regulation on the subject. Even accepting this argument however, there is a thin distinction left for Francis Ford:
there was no prior FTC law on the subject of the adjudication,
but there was existing state law (UCC 9_504).100 But to find that
the FTC adjudication changed existing state law is perforce to
assume, as did the Francis Ford court without so stating, that
the FTC has the power to "change" existing state law. Of course
it does not.

7.

The problem of "existing law"

The "generalized standard" of Francis Ford has severe
workability problems; the requirement that the adjudication not
"change existing law" is problematical in the extreme. It requires a determination that may often be quite difficult. Professor Davis spoke to a closely related point: "An impossible line to
98. 394 U.S. at 765, 775.
99. 332 U.S. at 200-01.
100. 673 F.2d at 1010.
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draw is the theoretical one between creating new law through
interpretation and discovering the meaning that is already there;
the line cannot be drawn because the two items commonly
overlap. "101
An illustration of the problem is that one could very plausibly argue that what the FTC attempted to do in Francis Ford
was not to change existing law, but rather to change its interpretation of existing law. This comports with the traditional understanding of agency adjudicative proceedings as quasi-judicial
and agency rulemaking proceedings as quasi-legislative: what
courts do in interpreting statutes is not to "change law" - it is
to interpret the law that already exists. Administrative agencies
such as the FTC, interpreting statutes through adjudication, do
not "change existing law" any more than courts do through statutory interpretation.
It may be forecast with assurance that the Francis Ford test

in application will lead to inconsistent results: what is one
judge's "change in existing law" will quite likely be another's
"clarification." In many cases the determination, instead of
lending greater certainty to the law, will be, or seem, arbitrary.
Professor Davis had drawn perhaps the most useful line between what is a change in existing law and what is not. Ironically, the Francis Ford panel cited his views in support of the
proposition that "courts should require agencies to use rulemaking procedures when the agency retroactively adopts new law or
where the parties have relied on the precedents."102 But it is apparent from a review of the cited material that what Professor
Davis contemplated by this concept were those situations where
an agency "changes a former rule"I03 and where an "agency
through adjudication makes a change in clear law, as when it
overrules a batch of its own decisions. "104 Where, as in Francis
Ford, there was no prior rule changed or batch of decisions overruled - i.e., there was no retroactive change in settled law Professor Davis' concept would not apply on its own terms.
Neither the FTC nor any court had ruled that Francis Ford's
101.
102.
103.
104.

2 DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 7:25, at 155 (1980) (emphasis added).
673 F.2d at 1009, quoting 2 DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE, § 7:25, at 124 (1980).
2 DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE § 7:25, at 124 (1980).
[d. at 122.
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credit practices or similar ones were not violative of the FTCA.
The basis on which the Francis Ford court determined that the
dealer had not violated existing Oregon law, VCC 9-504, was
specious: the court found that since no Oregon court had held
these practices violative of the Oregon enactment of the VCC,
Francis Ford could not be held in violation of existing state
law. 1011 But the court admitted that Oregon courts had never had
the question before them. loe Necessarily, therefore, it cannot be
held that there was prior existing law on the question which the
FTC sought to "change." Rather, there was no prior law on the
subject whatsoever.

E.

CONCLUSION

Administrative agencies exist because they are uniquely
able to develop and implement expert judgment in specialized
fields, in a manner beyond the capability of courts of general
jurisdiction. In order to function effectively, agencies must be
free to develop expertise, and able, within the bounds of due
process, to implement judgments based on that special competence. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Francis Ford adversely
strikes at both aspects of this general idea.
Agencies develop judgment in a field through actual experience dealing with individual violators. It is manifest that, for example, Congress intended the FTC to utilize individual administrative adjudications in particular areas in exploring whether the
making of formal legislative rules was feasible and desirable. l07
This article has demonstrated that, under the rule of Francis Ford, agencies may not safely rely on adjudication as a key
means by which to develop knowledge within areas of potential
rulemaking. Those violators whose unfair or deceptive practices
seem widespread and are arguably not remedied in existing interpretations of the applicable statutes, are placed beyond the
effective reach of administrative adjudication in the Ninth Circuit. Agencies may not develop expertise with such violators.
Deprived of a critical means of developing administrative
105. 673 F.2d at 1010.
106. [d.
107. See supra note 76.
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expertise, agencies must resort to other means. They must rely
on the techniques of formal rule making-the second-hand experience of administrative hearings, rather than the direct knowledge that springs from dealing with suspected violators. The net
result is decreased agency effectiveness. The net loss is the
public's.
In contrast, the four-part inquiry which courts reviewing an
agency choice of adjudication must perform in following Chenery II and Bell Aerospace does not artificially limit the scope
of administrative discretion. Rather, the Supreme Court's tested
analytic methodology utilizes familiar equitable concepts in light
of legislative intent and the circumstances of the particular case.
Because the Ninth Circuit's novel approach is both an unjustified departure from tested principles of review, and analytically unsound, Francis Ford should be overruled at the earliest
opportunity. lOB

ARONSEN V. CROWN ZELLERBACH: UNDERSTANDING
PERPLEXING ADEA PROCEDURES
A.

INTRODUCTION

In Aronsen u. Crown Zellerbach, 1 the Ninth Circuit held
that a grievant bringing an action under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA),I in a deferral state,3 has 300 days
108. Judge Reinhardt, dissenting from the Ninth Circuit's denial of rehearing en
bane, suggested that the Francis Ford decision might be limited in future cases to situations in which the adjudicative rule could have been addressed in a contemporaneous
rulemaking process which dealt with separate but related matters. 673 F.2d at 1012 n.2.
However, as this article has demonstrated, there is little in the reasoning of the Francis
Ford opinion which suggests to potential litigants that the Ninth Circuit would consider
the applicability of its "generalized standard" to be limited to such situations. "Ultimately, however, we are persuaded to set aside this order because the rule of the case
made below will have general application," wrote the Ninth Circuit judges. 673 F.2d at
1010.
1. 662 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Tang, J.; other panel memebers were Pregerson,
J. and Kelleher, D.J., sitting by designation, concurring), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1183
(1983).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970) amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act
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in which to file notice of intent to sue. 4 The court further held
that a grant of summary judgment had been inappropriate because a material issue of fact existed as to whether plaintiff
knew or should have known that he was a victim of an unlawful
practice. In so holding, the court announced a method to determine when an unlawful practice occurs. II
The plaintiff, age fifty-two, was terminated by the defendant after twenty-eight years of employment with the company.s
He alleged that the sole basis for his termination was defendant's general plan to replace employees nearing retirement with
younger employees.' Plaintiff claimed that his last day with the
company was April 21, 1976 and that he gave notice of intent to
sue to the Secretary of Labor on January 19, 1977, approximately 270 days later.8
The defendant argued that on March 31, 1975, plaintiff was
informed of his pending termination and given a choice between
taking a demotion or accepting the termination and staying with
the company during a transition period. s Plaintiff remained on
the payroll until March 31, 1976. 10 He received payments for accumulated benefits until April 21, 1976. 11
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
3. A deferral state is one in which state law exists prohibiting age discrimination
and an agency is authorized to grant or seek relief on behalf of the grievant. See The
Procedural Requirements of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 9
RUTGERS CAMDEN L. REV. 540, 550 (1978).
4. The Aronsen opinion noted a change in the relevant statute since the case in
question was heard:
In 1978, this section was amended so that only a "charge
alleging unlawful discrimination" need be tiled. According to
the legislative history of this amendment, the charge requirement is satistied by a written statement identifying the potential defendant and describing generally the action believed to
be discriminatory. The change from "notice of intent to sue"
to "charge" was not intended to alter the basic purpose of the
prior law.
662 F.2d at 587 n.3. (Citations omitted).
5. Id. at 593-94.
6. Id. at 585.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9. Id. at 586.
10.Id.
11. Id. at 585.
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The date of termination was pivotal to an ADEA claim
since March 31, 1975 was far outside the 300 day filing limit,
while March 31, 1976 or April 21, 1976 were within the period
allowed. The district court held that March 31, 1975 was the applicable date of termination. It reasoned that it was on that date
that plaintiff knew he was being terminated, and ceased his active employment with the company. The court dismissed the
complaint because it was not filed within 300 days of March 31,
1975. 11 The appeal was based on the factual dispute over the
date of termination.
B.

BACKGROUND

Statutory Filing Period
The statutory language of 29 U.S.C. section 626(d)18 does
not expressly mandate resort to a deferral state's own remedy as
a prerequisite to a private action under ADEA. As a result there
has been considerable controversy over whether initiation of
state proceedings is optional. 14 Since the grievant must give notice of intent to sue within the applicable 180 or 300 day period
12. [d.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976) as in effect at the time of plaintiff's suit provided:
(d) No civil action may be commenced by any individual
under this section until the individual has given the Secretary
not le88 than sixty days' notice of an intent to file such action.
Such notice shall be filed(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged
unlawful practice occurred, or
(2) in a ~e to which section 633(b) of this title applies,
within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful practice
occurred or within thirty days after receipt by the individual
of notice of termination of proceedings under State law,
whichever is earlier. Upon receiving a notice of intent to sue,
the Secretary shall promptly notify all persons named therein
as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly
seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal
methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.
See note 16 infra for text of 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
14. See Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981) (grievant need not
file with the state in order to preserve a federal action); Ciccone v. Textron, Inc., 616
F.2d 1216 (lst Cir. 1980) (state proceeding must be commenced within 180 days to preserve a federal action), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 914 (1981), rev'd and remanded,
664 F.2d 884 (1981); Ewald v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 620 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir.
1980) (grievant must file with the state agency to preserve a federal action), vacated and
remanded, 449 U.S. 914 (1981). rev'd and remanded, 664 F.2d 884 (1981); Bean v. Crocker Nat'! Bank, 600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (grievant need not file with the state to
preserve a federal action).
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after the alleged act of discrimination, courts have struggled to
define whether filing within 180 days is also necessary in a deferral state to preserve the 120 day extention. The Supreme Court
has not made a decision which directly controls the issue. Consequently, circuit courts have extrapolated language and reasoning
used by the Court in deciding issues closely related to section
626(d).111
Section 633(b)18 applies when a complaint is filed in a deferral state. Interpreting this section, the Supreme Court, in Oscar
Mayer & Co. v. Evans,17 held that grievants must resort to state
administrative proceedings before bringing suit in federal
court.18 The Court also held that commencement of these proceedings need not be timely under state law in order to preserve
a private federal right under ADEA.19
The Evans decision concerned the relationship between
filing a federal suit and commencing a state action, rather than
that between commencing a state action and filing a federal notice of intent to sue. The Court gave no direct answer as to
whether a grievant must commence a state action within 180
days as a prerequisite to filing a federal notice.IIO The decision
15. See supra note 14.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(b) In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in
a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State
authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory
practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title
before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under the State law, unleBB such proceedings have
been earlier terminated: Provided, That such sixty-day period
shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the
first year after the effective date of such State law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceeding is imposed by a State authority other than a requirement of the
filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon
which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed
to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at
the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State authority.
17. 441 U.S. 750 (1979).
18. Id. at 758.
19. Id. at 753.
20. The Court merely noted that provisions of Title VII require filing with state
agencies first, and that filing under ADEA is different: "Under the ADEA, by contrast,
grievants may file with state and federal agencies simultaneously." 441 U.S. at 756.
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did, however, give lower courts a tool to use in interpreting
ADEA language, and hence section 626, by stating that analogies
to similar provisions in Title VII are appropriate. 21
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Olson u. Rembrandt Printing CO.22 has been extensively relied upon by the circuits in interpreting Title VII filing provisions, and ADEA provisions by
analogy. In Olson the complainant filed a discrimination charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
more than 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice. She did
not institute a state proceeding. The court held that in a deferral state, a charge of employment discrimination must be filed
with the state agency within 180 days in order to trigger the 300
day filing period with the EEOC.28
.. ADEA grievants may file with the State before or after they file with the Secretary of
Labor." [d. at 756 n.4.
21. The Evans Court analogized § 14(b) of ADEA (29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1979» to §
706(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976):
Since the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose,
the elimination of discrimination in the workplace, since the
language of § 14(b) is almost in haec verba with § 706(c), and
since the legislative history of § 14(b) indicates that its source
was § 706(c) , we may properly conclude that Congress intended that the construction of § 14(b) should follow that of §
706(c).
441 U.S. at 756. The analogous Title VII provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976)
provides:
(c) In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State,
which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a
State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto
upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under
subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before
the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings
have been earlier terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during
the first year after the effective date of such State or local law.
If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings
is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the
facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall
be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this
subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered
mail to the appropriate State or local authority.
22. 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975).
23. [d. at 1233.
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In determining whether filing of a state grievance within 180
days is optional, the Evans Court offered conflicting guidance.
Thus, the dilemma of the circuits has been one of interpretation.
On one hand, the Court stressed the identical purpose and language of ADEA and Title VII provisions, thereby encouraging
analogy between the two. u On the other hand, it noted the inherant difference in regard to jurisdiction between ADEA and
Title VII since unlike Title VII, ADEA permits concurrent state
and federal jurisdiction in order to aid older citizens who have
fewer productive years remaining. 2 1!
In Bean v. Crocker National Bank,26 the Ninth Cicuit held
that in deferral states ADEA grievants have 300 days in which
to file with the Secretary of Labor.2'1 Bean interpreted Evans to
mean that, while a grievant must resort to appropriate state
remedies, compliance with applicable state procedures need only
occur sixty days prior to a federal suit. Bean reasoned that since
the only stated requirement in Evans was filing with the agency
prior to a federal suit, it was not logical to infer that the grievant
meet the 180 day deadline as a prerequisite to a federal right. 28
The Bean court specifically rejected the application of the Olson
approach in Title VII filing matters to ADEA complaints. 29
Following Bean, two circuits examined both the language of
the statute and the Evans decision and reached a contrary conclusion. The First Circuit in Ciccone v. Textron 30 and the Sixth
Circuit in Ewald v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea CO.31 held that
filing with a state agency within 180 days is a prerequisite to
24. 441 U.S. at 756.
25. [d. at 757.
26. 600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979).
27. [d. at 758.
28. [d. at 758-59.
29. [d. at 758. The Bean Court asserted that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Evans, the Olson reasoning relating to Title VII claims does not apply to filing
limitation periods under the ADEA. Bean reasoned that since the Supreme Court held in
Evans that state limitation periods are irrelevant for purposes of commencing state proceedings in relationship to commencing federal actions, compliance with state time limitations in a deferral state must also be deemed irrelevant for purposes of determining
whether a complainant has 180 or 300 days to file notice of intent to sue with the Secretary. [d. at 759.
30. 616 F.2d 1216 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 914 (1981), rev'd
and remanded, 651 F.2d 1 (1981).
31. 620 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 914 (1981), rev'd
and remanded, 644 F.2d 884 (1981).
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federal filing. 82 These courts reasoned that: first, a literal reading
of the statute underestimates the intent of the legislature;88 and
second, that analogies to Title VII in Evans provide the proper
approach to similar ADEA provisions. 84 Both cases specifically
declined to follow Bean. 811
Looking at the language of the statute, the Ewald court opposed a "casual" reading,88 while the Ciccone court warned
against reading the statute "simplistically".87 Both opinions reasoned that where section 633(b) applies, it does so on the condition that "the complainant has diligently sought a state remedy."88 Neither found an arbitrary award of 120 days to
claimants who happen to reside in a deferral state in keeping
with their reading of congessional goals. Ciccone argued that:
The evident purpose of the extended filing period
is to give the plaintiff a grace period within which
to pursue state remedies he has invoked before
being compelled to institute a federal charge. This
purpose would in no way be furthered by providing a windfall of 120 days to plaintiffs living in
deferral states even though they had not instituted a charge with the state agency within the
initial filing period. a,

In addition the First and Sixth Circuits relied on analogies
to Title VII provisions-an approach taken by the Evans Court.
Using the Olson formula, i.e., a grievant obtains the extended
filing period in a deferral state only if the state mechanism has
been used within 180 days, these circuits ruled against grievants
who had not filed within the applicable 180 day period. 40
In a decision after Evans, the Supreme Court unraveled
32. 616 F.2d at 1221; 620 F.2d at 1187.
33. 616 F.2d at 1220; 620 F.2d at 1186.
34. 616 F.2d at 1220; 620 F.2d at 1187.
35. 616 F.2d at 1221; 620 F.2d at 1186.
36. 620 F.2d at 1186.
37. 616 F.2d at 1220.
38. [d.; see also 620 F.2d at 1186.
39. 616 F.2d at 1220-21.
40. See Silver v. Mohaaco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083, 1087 (2d Cir. 1979) (300 days to
file), rev'd on other grounds, Mohaaco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); Doski v. M.
Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1330-33 (1976). In Wiltshire v. Standard Oil Co., 652 F.2d
837,839 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982), the Ninth Circuit rejected
Olson and found that 300 days waa the proper time limit.
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much of the confusion over appropriate filing periods in deferral
states. The Court held, in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,4! that a
grievant bringing a claim with the EEOC in a deferral state has
300 days to file; however, state proceedings must terminate sixty
days prior to the EEOC commencing any action.42
Mohasco is important to the resolution of controversies sur-

rounding ADEA filing periods because of the Court's disagreement with the Eighth Circuit's approach in Olson to filing limitations and its application in the Ciccone and Ewald decisions. 43
Mohasco objected to the restrictive approach in which a complainant under all circumstances must file with either the state
or federal agencies within 180 days. Mohasco stated that a court
should not read in a time limitation provision that Congress has
not seen fit to include. 44 The Court thereafter vacated and remanded both Ciccone and Ewald for consideration consistent
with the reasoning of Mohasco.411
Determination of the Occurrence of an Unlawful Practice

Disputes over whether or not a grievant has filed within the
allotted period often focus on the date the unlawful practice occurred. It is on this day that the applicable time limitation begins to run. Since determining exactly when a grievant has been
subjected to an unlawful practice may be difficult, courts have
devised methods to assist this process.
41. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
42. [d. at 814 n.16. Mohasco thus adopts the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Title VII filing periods in Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972). Mohasco
notes:
Under the Moore decision, which we adopt today, a complainant in a deferral State having a fair employment practices
agency over one year old need only file his charge within 240
days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice in order to insure that his federal rights will be preserved. If a
complainant files later than· that (but not more than 300 days
after the practice complained 00, his right to seek relief under
Title VII will nonetheless be preserved if the State happens to
complete its consideration of the charge prior to the end of the
300-day period.
447 U.S. at 814 n.16.
43. 447 U.S. at 816 n.19.
44. [d.
45. 449 U.S. 914 (1981). Upon further consideration both decisions were reversed by
the circuit courts. 651 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981); 644 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1981).
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The Third Circuit in Bonham u. Dresser Industries 48 ruled
that where unequivocal notice of termination coincides with the
employee's last day of work, the unlawful practice will be
deemed to have occurred and the filing period begins to run.47
The Eighth Circuit attempted to devise a clearcut standard in
Moses u. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,48 concluding that the official
termination date as it appeared in company personnel records
was the date on which the filing period began to run.49
The Supreme Court in Delaware State College u. Ricksr.o
announced a rationale that differed from both Bonham and
Moses. Ricks involved a dispute in a Title VII action. The petitioner was denied tenure by the employer and given a terminable one-year contract. Although the petitioner claimed that the
filing period began to run when the terminable contract expired,
the Supreme Court did not agree, holding that the unlawful act
of discrimination occurred when the "tenure decision was made
and communicated to Ricks."r.1 Thus the Supreme Court announced a subjective method for determining the actual occurrence of an unlawful act. The grievant's knowledge that an unlawful practice has taken place will be the crucial element in
initiating the time period in which to seek redress.
C.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

Statutory Filing Period

In deciding Aronsen, the Ninth Circuit first addressed the
issue of the appropriate statutory filing period in an ADEA action. The statute provides that a grievant file notice of intent to
sue within 180 days of the alleged violation, or within 300 days
in a deferral state. The court noted that in Bean the Ninth Circuit had construed the requirement time in a deferral state to be
300 days.r.2 However, the defendant urged the court to recon46. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
47. 569 F.2d at 191.
48. 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975).
49. [d. at 94.
50. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
51. [d. at 258. The Court found support for this conclusion in the Ninth Circuit case
of Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202 (1979). Abramson held that "[tJhe
proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the
consequences of the acts became most painful." 1d. at 209 (emphasis added).
52. See Bean, 600 F.2d 754, 756.
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sider its position in light of the contrary circuit court decisions
in Ewald and Ciccone. In reaffirming the Ninth Circuit's stand
on this issue, the Aronsen court examined the plain language of
the statute, recalled its prior reasoning in Bean, and considered
and dispensed with the interpretations of ADEA filing periods
advanced by other circuits.
Examining the words used by Congress to enact this legislation, the court found that the statute explicitly states that grievants have 300 days in which to file an ADEA action. 1I3 Section
626(d)(2) indicates that where section 633(b) applies (complaints filed in a deferral state) 300 days is allotted. The court
saw no reason to depart from this plain congressional language. 54
Second, the court reiterated the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Bean. The Bean analysis relied heavily on the Supreme Court in
Evans. Bean extended the Evans rationale-that state limitations are irrelevant for purposes of commencing state proceedings in ADEA actions-to further indicate that state limitations
were also irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a complainant has 180 or 300 days in which to file notice of intent to
sue. 1I1I
The Aronsen court found the plain language of the statute,
and the analysis of the code in Bean, sufficient to support its
refusal to change the Ninth Circuit position. However, in an effort to fully dispense with the controversy stemming from other
circuit decisions, the court examined the aspects of these decisions which it found to be unpersuasive. 1I8
The court opposed the conclusion reached by the Ewald
and Ciccone decisions that the legislative purpose of section
626(d) required that the plain language of the statute not be
controlling, and that the statute be construed consistent with
the intention of Congress. The Aronsen court did not agree with
reasoning that would discern from legislative history a procedure
which is more restrictive than a plain reading of the statute's
53.
54.
55.
56.

See
662
600
662

supra note 13 for applicable statutory language.
F.2d 584, 588.
F.2d 754, 759.
F.2d 584, 588-90.
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text. II?
Although the court found little direction in the record regarding the 1967 enactment of ADEA section 626(d), the court
noted that the history behind the 1978 amendment of this section revealed no ambiguity about filing periods in deferral states:
Section 7(d) of the Act requires that an individual
must give the Department of Labor notice of intent to file suit within 180 days after the alleged
unlawful practice occurs. This period is extended
to 300 days where the alleged unlawful practice
occurs in a state which has an age discrimination
statute which provides a remedy.'''

The Aronsen court thus found that the statutory history
and language were clear and that the construction given to
626(d) by other circuits imposed time restrictions "patently absent"119 from the language used by Congress.
Finally, the court objected to arguments offered by the First
and Sixth Circuits which relied on restrictive interpretation of
similar language in Title VII. The court noted that although
analogies to Title VII are validated by the Supreme Court's decision in Evans, disputes have consistently existed on the issue
of whether a grievant must commence a state proceeding within
180 days in order to preserve the 300 days for federal filing.
While Ewald and Ciccone relied on the Olson court's interpretation, other circuits did not agree. 80
The court was further satisfied that the Supreme Court's
57. The Aronsen opinion noted:
In interpreting statutes, we are not free to substitute legislative history for the language of the statute. Statutory interpretation must begin with the statute itself. The court in Ciccone inverted this process. Although there is no per se bar
preventing resort to legislative history even when the statute,
as here, is plain on its face, we question Ciccone's reliance on
legislative history to restrict access to the federal courts by
imposing time restraints patently absent from and contrary to
the statute's text.
662 F.2d at 588 n.7 (citations omitted).
58. [d. at 589, quoting H.R. CON'. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 504, 523-24.
59. 622 F.2d at 588 n.7.
60. [d. at 589.
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decision in Mohasco, in which the Olson approach was openly
disapproved, resolved the disagreement regarding the proper interpretation of filing periods.Bl The Mohasco court cited Ciccone
as following substantially the same reasoning as Olson and
therefore equally in error.Bt Aronsen concluded that both Ewald
and Ciccone could not be used as persuasive authority in the
Ninth Circuit, and thereby reaffirmed its position in Bean that
in deferral states, grievants have 300 days in which to file their
charges. Bs
Determination of the Occurrence of an Unlawful Practice

The Aronsen court held that a material issue of fact was in
dispute at the time of the district court's decision. There had
been no conclusive determination of when the plaintiff was actually terminated for purposes of establishing when the filing period began to run. The court also announced a procedure for determining when the alleged unlawful practice occurred based on
the Supreme Court's decision in Delaware State College v.
Ricks. B•
The district court had relied on Bonham v. Dresser Industries B6 in making its decision, and had rejected Moses v. Falstaff
Brewing Co. BB The Ninth Circuit briefly examined these holdings
and found that the objective standards outlined in Bonham (receipt of written notice and cessation of work), or Moses (termination on personnel records), were useful but not satisfactory.
The Aronsen court concluded that the case-by-case method advanced in Ricks was the better approach.B7
Aronsen construed the Ricks holding to mean that the
plaintiff's knowledge that he or she had been the victim of an
unlawful practice is the central factor in determining when the
unlawful practice occurred. Bs Aronsen thus held that the applicable filing period begins to run when the grievant knew or
61. Id. at 590.
62.Id.
63. Id. at 590-91.
64. 449 U.S. 250, 259 (1980).
65. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
66. 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975).
67. 662 F.2d 584, 593-94.
68. Id. at 593.
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should have known that an unlawful practice had occurred, and
that this knowledge could be based on a number of factors including notice, termination or work and personal records. The
factual situations in each case must therefore be determined. 69
D.

CRITIQUE

The first issue in Aronsen presented a simple question: in a
deferral state, how many days does a claimant have in which to
file a notice of intent to sue with the Secretary of Labor? The
Ninth Circuit had previously addressed and dispensed with this
issue in Bean, but the First and Sixth Circuit's express disagreement with Bean's statutory interpretation challenged the court
to reaffirm its position.
Under the Ewald and Ciccone holdings, it was necessary for
the grievant to file with a state agency within 180 days in order
to qualify for, or preserve, the additional 120 days in which to
file with the Department of Labor. These courts analogized to
Title VII in reaching their decisions, relying heavily on Olson.
However, at the time Aronsen was decided, the Aronsen panel
was aware that the Supreme Court had summarily vacated both
Ciccone and Ewald for further consideration in light of
Mohasco. 70 The Ninth Circuit decison on the issue of proper
filing periods was thus of questionable length and complexity
since Mohasco, by rejecting the Olson approach, and by equating Ciccone with Olson, undercut the force of the Ciccone and
Ewald holdings. A concise affirmation of Bean, supported by the
Mohasco opinion, making special note of the remand of both
Ewald and Ciccone, would therefore have been sufficient.
69. 662 F.2d at 594. The court also noted that the doctrine of equitable modification
may affect the tolling period on an ADEA action. See Naton v. Bank of California, 649
F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981). Such modifications are of two types: the first, equitable tolling,
is based on the excusable ignorance of the plaintiff; the second, equitable estoppel, focuses on actions of the defendant which mislead the plaintiff and thereby induce him to
delay filing of notice of intent to sue. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.
1976), aff'd by equally divided Court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977).
To determine whether equitable relief is warranted, a case-by-case review of the factual circumstances is necessary. Naton, 649 F.2d at 696. The Aronsen court concluded
that further factual development was needed to resolve the issue of equitable modification, and therefore the grant of summary judgment to defendant was also reversible on
this basis. 662 F.2d at 595.
70. See supra note 45.
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The Aronsen court provides some clear guidance on the second question of how an occurrence of an unlawful employment
practice should be identified. The court articulated a new
method for pinpointing the unlawful practice by adopting the
rule announced by the Supreme Court in Ricks. The Ricks approach involves two elements: the unlawful practice, and the
employee's knowledge of its occurrence. When both of these elements are fulfilled, the filing period begins to run.
As Aronsen points out, this approach is not an objective,
clear-cut standard. Rather, the approach is subjective since it focuses on the employee's knowledge to determine when the filing
period begins. It is a fair standard for two reasons. First, it discourages employers from failing to inform employees of federal
employment guarantees because the employee's lack of knowledge would simply prolong the availability of a remedy. Second,
it encourages employees to file their grievance as soon as they
become aware of an unlawful occurrence or else lose their remedy for failing to file in a timely fashion.
E.

CONCLUSION

The Aronsen decision is definitive in two areas of ADEA
procedure. As intractable as the statute itself may seem, Aronsen correctly reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit interpretation that in
a deferral state a grievant has 300 days within which to file a
claim with the Secretary of Labor. The opinion also announced a
fair and flexible method for triggering the time limitation, based
on the factual situation of each occurrence. As perplexing as asserting one's right under ADEA may be, Aronsen does clarify
the initial steps of the procedure.
Susan D. Hainline·

• Third year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
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OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. No IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER VA HOME LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM

In Rank v. Nimmo,l the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) no implied right of action exists under the Veterans Administration
(VA) Home Loan Guarantee Program 2 against either the VA or
a private lender for failure to assist a borrower under that program to avoid foreclosure; (2) the VA's lender's handbooks or
circulars s or its broad discretion create no duty in the VA to
take reasonable measures to avoid foreclosure; and, (3) foreclosure by a private lender who had serviced a VA loan does not
involve federal action sufficient to invoke constitutional due process rights.
Plaintiffs purchased a home in California for $16,950,
financing the entire price through a VA guaranteed loan. The
loan was assigned to the Government National Mortgage Association with Kissell Company, a private mortgage firm, acting as
GNMA's agent for payment collection and servicing in the event
of foreclosure. Plaintiffs experienced difficulty meeting their
loan obligations, eventually ceasing their loan payments altogether. The VA informed plaintiffs that it could do nothing to
prevent a potential foreclosure. Kissell foreclosed on the mortgage, and pursuant to the guarantee arrangement, it was conveyed to the VA:'
The court held that "neither the statutory language nor the
history of the VA Act itself provides any indication of legislative
intent ... to create" a private remedy against the VA or a private lender for failure to help a veteran borrower avoid foreclosure. 1I Instead, the court noted, the program was designed to in1. 677 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were Norris, J. and Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en
bane, May 6, 1982), cert. denied. 103 S. Ct. 210 (1982).
2. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1827 (1976 & Supp. v 1981).
3. See VA LENDER'S HANDBOOK, VA PAMPHLET No. 26-7 (Revised) which begins:
"[The Handbook is) designed to guide lenders in the processing of applications for loans
. . . and in the treatment of defaults and claims arising through loans made. Nothing
contained here shall be construed to modify or otherwise alter any provisions of the
[Code of Federal Regulations relating to VA loans)." 677 F.2d at 694. See also VA CIRCULAR 26-75-8 (Jan. 1974) and VA MANUAL M26-3, CHANGE 46,2.35.
4. 677 F.2d at 695-96.
5. The same conclusion was reached in Simpson v. Cleland, 640 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir.
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duce private lenders to extend home loans to veterans. The
program therefore "relies on financial incentives to accomplish a
welfare objective and does not purport to confer enforceable federal rights directly on the veteran-borrower."6
In addition, the court noted the availability of apparently
adequate remedies under the VA Act7 as well as the availability
of state law remedies to protect mortgagors from improper mortgagee practices. Regarding the latter point, the court speculated
as to the likelihood that Congress intended to establish a "federal common law of mortgages" to assist or displace the parallel
laws of the states. 6
As to whether the VA Act imposed a particular duty upon
the VA to undertake supplemental servicing of its guaranteed
loans and whether the VA's refusal to take an assignment of
plaintiffs' loan was a judicially reviewable abllse of discretion,
the court noted first that the VA Act itself imposes no duty
upon the VA to service VA loans. 9 Therefore, any duty must
flow from the VA Lender's Handbook and circulars. The latter
publications would only be granted the force of law if they were
first considered legislative in nature and not mere statements of
administrative policy or practice. 1o
1981).
6. 677 F.2d at 697.
7. The court referred to 38 U.S.C. §§ 1804(d) and 1816(a) (1976). Section 1804(d)
authorizes the VA to deny participation in the loan guarantee program to private lenders
who fail to provide adequate servicing of VA guaranteed loans. Section 1816(a) allows
the VA to refund the unpaid balance of the loan obligation to the lender and receive an
assignment of the loan and its security from the lender. 677 F.2d at 697 n.9. As the
dissent noted, neither "remedy" appears to give borrowers any rights against either the
VA or the private lender. [d. at 704 n.5.
8. 677 F.2d at 697. Since Rank only concerned the indirect or guaranteed VA loan
program, the question remains whether a private right of action may still lie against the
VA under the direct loan program, 38 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976).
9. 677 F.2d at 699 n.12.
10. The court cited the two-part test of Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301
(1979), as controlling. Under Brown the VA publications would be given the force of law
if they (1) announce substantive rules, rather than recite general statements of administrative policy, and (2) conform to certain procedural requirements. 677 F.2d at 698.
Courts have consistently held that no duty arises under administrative handbooks
which essentially are interpreted as general statements of agency policy and procedure.
See, e.g., Chasse v. Chasen, 595 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1979) (Custom Service Circular created
no private right of action); First State Bank of Hudson County v. United States, 599
F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980) (FDIC manual creates no duty
on part of FDIC to inform bank of incorrect use of bank funds by bank president);
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The court found that neither publication prescribed substantive "'legislative-type' rules enforceable . . . against the
VA."l1 Rather, since some publications were issued merely in response to the economic recession of 1974-75, and none were published in the Federal Register nor available for public scrutiny,
no intent to grant them legal force and effect was apparent. To
do so, the court indicated, would hamper the communication
within the agency that the circulars provided. I i
Addressing the issue of whether the VA abused its discretion in not taking an assignment of plaintiff's loan, the court
held that the VA statute leaves no doubt that the VA is granted
the "widest possible discretion" to opt for assignment/refunding,
depending on numerous factors such as VA budget and personnel, risk of loss to the VA, the adequacy of prior loan servicing
and the circumstances of the default.18 The court concluded that
the statute was narrowly drafted, specifically granting the VA
the option to take or refuse an assignment and left no room for
judicial review of its decision. a
The court also found the VA was not required to exercise
the assignment/refunding option according to the language of
the statute. Even though this issue was judicially reviewable as
compared to the issue regarding abuse of discretion in failing to
opt for assignment/refund, the court nevertheless found no congressional intent requiring the VA to exercise the option. III
Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that no violation of due process occurred because there was an insufficient nexus between
the VA and the private lender, since the private lender's action
in foreclosing could not be attributed to the federal
Brown v. Lynn, 392 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (HUD handbook directing private lenders servicing HUD-insured mortgages to forebear from foreclosure in face of alternatives
was intended as policy guideline and without legal force or effect).
11. 677 F.2d at 698.
12. [d.
13. [d. at 700.

14. The decision would be reviewable by showing the VA's improper consideration
of factors or consideration of factors outside those described by the court. 677 F.2d at
700.
15. The court stated the VA was free to exercise the option fully or not at all, reserving the option for the "exceptional or unusual case." While not elaborating, the court
was apparently further underlining its view that the entire matter was not appropriate
for judicial review. 677 F.2d at 700.
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government. 16
Judge Reinhardt dissented from that part of the court's
opinion concerning the VA's discretion under the VA Act. He
argued that the VA's failure to take any action regarding plaintiffs' loan constituted an illegal failure to exercise its discretion
thereby requiring the VA to consider opting for assignment/
refund.
The dissent argued that the majority had ignored the sum
total of congressional intent behind the VA statutes, adopting a
"newly discovered principle of administrative law" allowing the
VA to ignore a statute's operating standards and policy.17 He·
contended that in light of the objectives and techniques set out
in the laws to accomplish them-to provide incentives for lending to veteran borrowers and for reasonable forbearance from
and insurance in the event of foreclosure-it was unlikely that
Congress had intended such techniques not be considered or
used. 18 The dissent argued that Congress merely intended to
leave practical decisions to the discretion of the VA, not to allow
it to completely disregard the mandates inherent in the statutes.
The dissent also criticized the majority's lack of consistency.
While agreeing with the court's general view that decisions of
the agency are not judicially reviewable, the dissent found it inconsistent and erroneous that the court had later sanctioned the
VA's failure to make any decision as to plaintiffs' loan. Further,
the majority's recitation of the "remedies" already available
under section 1816(a) unpersuasively supported a holding that
veterans have no private right of action. The section 1816(a)
remedies, the dissent implied, have nothing to do with whether a
private remedy also inures to the benefit of veterans. IS
16. [d. at 701-02. Ct. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51
(1974).

17. 677 F.2d at 703.
18. In partial support of this contention, Judge Reinhardt summarized the conditions of notice to the VA as demonstrative of Congress' intent to compel the VA and
private lenders to carry out the legislative intent. 677 F.2d at 704 n.5.
19. 677 F.2d at 705.
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1973

In Fisher u. City of Tucson,20 the Ninth Circuit found that
there was no implied provision for private enforcement of the
anti-discriminatory policy in contracting situations under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. U In so finding, the
court applied the four factors, set forth by the Supreme Court in
Cort u. Ash, n relevant to determine whether a private right of
action may be implied to enforce the provisions of a statute
which does not expressly provide a right of action. 23
The court found that section 503 creates a federal right on
behalf of a protected class-that of handicapped individuals.24
20. 663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were Farris,
J. and Fletcher, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 178 (1982).
21. Section 503 provides that: "Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any
Federal department or agency ... shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing
persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States shall
take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals." 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976).
Section 793(b) provides:
If any handicapped individual believes any contractor has
failed or refuses to comply with the provisions of his contract
with the United States, relating to employment of handicapped individuals, such individual may file a complaint with
the Department of Labor. The Department shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take such action thereon as
the facts and circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms
of such contract and the laws and regulations applicable
thereto.
22. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
23. The factors are:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law.
[d. at 78-79 (citations omitted).
24. 663 F.2d at 863-64. This finding was contrary to that of Rogers v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1079-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980), where the Fifth
Circuit also concluded that section 503 does not create a private right of action. Other
circuits have considered the question presented in Fisher, and have found that no private right of action exists. See Davis v. United Airlines, 662 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1981);
Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1981).
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However, examining the legislative intent, the court concluded
that the federal right did not provide such individuals with a
private right of action. This conclusion turned upon several observations. First, the affirmative action requirement reflects congressional concern for the class, rather than the individual. 211
Second, the court was aware of no situation in which Congress
had expressly granted a private right of action to enforce affirmative action law. 2s Third, Congress did not make discrimination
against handicapped persons unlawful in section 503. Rather, it
"mandated that contractors discriminate in favor of handicapped individuals by implementing affirmative action programs."27 Finally, where a handicapped person has been discriminated against, that individual may file a complaint with the
Department of Labor.lIB
With regard to the underlying purpose of the legislative
scheme, the panel noted that "the provision of an express administrative remedy . . . created at least some basis to conclude
that a private right of action would be inconsistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme. "29 Considering the presence of
the administrative enforcement mechanism and section 503's instruction that contractors undertake affirmative action to employ handicapped persons, the court concluded that Congress intended that the Department of Labor supervise affirmative
action programs. 80 Under these circumstances, the court chose
not to imply what Congress failed to expressly provide. 81
Judge Fletcher concurred with the majority's finding that
section 503 creates no private right of action. However, she further found that Congress did intend to create a private right of
action to enforce section 503. In 1978, the Rehabilitation Act
was amended to allow a private party to recover attorney's fees
25. 663 F.2d at 864·65. The court also found that section 503 does not, on its face,
prohibit discrimination against handicapped persons. [d. at 864. See text of statute at
note 21, supra. Therefore, section 503 is distinguishable from section 504 of the Act
which provides a private right of action for handicapped individuals discriminated
against in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. [d. at 864.
26. 663 F.2d at 865.
27. [d. at 864 (emphasis in original).
28. [d. at 865. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976), quoted at note 21, supra.
29. 663 F.2d at 866, quoting Rogers, supra note 24, at 1084.
30. 663 F.2d at 866·67.
31. [d. at 867.
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as part of costs incurred in enforcing any provision of the Act. 32
The dissent found that this amendment indicated that Congress
assumed a private right of action under the Act already existed. 33 Further, the 1978 amendment committee and the 1973
committee responsible for enacting section 503 were composed
of many of the same members of Congress, several of whom
stated that they intended to create a private right of action. 34
The dissent also found the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to be consistent with allowing a private right of
action. The dissent disagreed with the majority's position that
since a remedy exists with the Department of Labor, a private
action under section 503 is foreclosed. The dissent observed that
dual enforcement schemes are commonplace. 311 Further, the Department of Labor, the agency charged with enforcement, supports the private right of action as a complement to the administrative mechanism. 38 Finally, section 503 is analogous to Title
IX as both have similar objectives-to confer benefits on a specific class of persons. Since the Supreme Court found an implied
right of action consistent with .the Title IX enforcement
scheme,37 the same result should be reached with respect to section 503. 38

32. 29 U.S.C. § 749a(b) (Supp. II 1978).
33. 663 F.2d at .868. The majority agreed that the addition of the attorney's fees
provision created an inference that Congress assumed a private right had been created in
1973. However, the majority found that because there was no indication that Congress
intended "to launch into a new area by providing a private right of action to enforce an
affirmative action law" and no "indication of how such a right would be enforced," Congress did not intend to create a private right of action when it enacted section 503. [d. at
866.

34. [d. at 869.
35. [d. at 870. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976) (Title VI) and 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976)
(Title IX). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976) (Title VII) (allowing private right of
action after exhausting administrative remedies); Allen v. State Board of Education, 393
U.S. 544 (1969) (finding private right of action under Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1976), despite provisions for enforcement by the Attorney General).
36. 663 F.2d at 870.
37. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979).
38. 663 F.2d at 870-71.
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